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This article overviews recent developments and set backs in the regulation and self-
regulation of Brazilian corporate governance. Ownership transitioned from concentrated 
control dominance to a mixed pattern of a substantial minority of companies with shared 
control under shareholder agreements and a few dispersed ownership companies. Recent 
statistics suggest a reversal in this trend with the increase in concentrated control 
companies. Companies that once embraced premium trading lists that required better 
corporate governance practices resisted a tightening of this self-regulation and some 
successfully and lawfully did not comply with new compensation disclosure regulation. 
Many companies have gone back private. Institutional investors, in general, did not show 
an effective contribution to corporate governance improvement in their investees and the 
largest ones face serious internal conflict of interest issues.  
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Este artigo examina avanços e recuos recentes na regulamentação e auto-regulação das 
práticas de governança corporativa no Brasil. Os direitos de propriedade passaram da 
dominância do controle concentrado para um padrão misto com uma minoria substancial 
de companhias com controle compartilhado sob um acordo de acionistas e algumas 
empresas com propriedade dispersa. Estatísticas recentes sugerem uma reversão dessa 
tendência com o aumento de companhias com controle concentrado. Empresas que um 
dia abraçaram os segmentos de listagem prêmio que exigiam melhores práticas de 
governança corporativa resistiram a um robustecimento desta auto-regulação e algumas 
não cumpriram as novas regras de transparência acerca da remuneração com sucesso e 
respaldo legal. Muitas companhias fecharam o capital. Os investidores institucionais, em 
geral, não contribuíram efetivamente para a melhoria da governança corporativa nas 
firmas em que investem e os maiores enfrentam sérios problemas internos de conflitos de 
interesse. 
Palavras-chave: direitos de propriedade; exigências de listagem; remuneração; 
transparência; investidores institucionais; governança corporativa; Brasil 
 
 
1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
This article discusses developments in Brazilian corporate governance practices, 
with an emphasis on recent transformations and the institutions that took part in them. This 
introduction is followed by a discussion of the partial reshaping of the concentrated 
ownership model towards a mixed and hybrid system. The important introduction of 
premium trading lists at the stock exchange and the attempts to reform them comes next. 
These premium-trading lists require that the companies that voluntarily join them abide to 
certain corporate governance and disclosure practices. Attempts to strengthen the 
requirements were only partially successful. Next the article addresses compensation levels, 
new rules to improve and expand compensation disclosure and the legal resistance to 
comply with them. Finally, a brief analysis of institutional investor engagement in Brazil and 
its muddled effects closes the article. The text highlights the most relevant institutions taking 
part of the events and their stance in most instances.  
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A picture of the recent evolution of corporate governance practices is presented in 
Leal, Carvalhal, and Iervolino (2015) who analyse a Corporate Governance Index (CGI) 
of Brazilian publicly traded companies between 2004 and 2013. The CGI series starts in 
1998 and has been calculated annually since then for each company traded on the 
exchange. Leal and Carvalhal da Silva (2007) proposed the original CGI version with 
objective questions that could be responded from publicly available information simply 
with a "yes" or "no".  
Leal et al. (2015) state that the overall corporate governance quality improved, 
especially after the stock exchange created the premium corporate governance trading 
lists. However, the average score of the index levelled in the last few years of their sample. 
They say that the average CGI of 5.8 (out of 10) in 2013 is low and suggest that there is 
room for improvement. Questions related to ethics and conflicts of interest achieve much 
lower scores than the other sets of questions regarding transparency, composition and 
functioning of the board and shareholder rights. The authors underline their concerns 
about the very small number of firms that ban loans to related parties or facilitate 
participation in shareholder meetings. They claim that lesser use of mechanisms to 
increase control, such as non-voting shares and indirect control structures, was a notable 
advance. Still, agreements among shareholders were more frequently used to interfere with 
the independence of directors and enhance the power of the controlling block.  
This article proceeds with sections discussing the emergence of a hybrid ownership 
model, a partially successful attempt to reform premium listing rules, recent developments 
and legal battles about compensation disclosure, and closing with the inconclusive effects 
of the entanglements of institutional investors with their investees in Brazil.   
 
2 – THE RISE OF A HYBRID MODEL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Brazil has been perceived as a low investor protection country. In the 1990s it 
certainly presented under developed corporate governance practices, typical of a highly 
concentrated ownership emerging economy, with many large firms controlled by families 
and the state, passive boards submitted to the will of controlling shareholders, widespread 
use of indirect control structures, and a very high percentage of non-voting shares in the 
equity capital of listed companies. Leal, Carvalhal and Valadares (2002) pointed out that 
the largest shareholder would hold a relevant share of the voting rights even in cases 
where there was no controlling shareholder. They also reveal that in those cases the three 
largest shareholders controlled companies, often pooled under an agreement, and that 
they often used pyramid schemes as a mechanism to warrant control at a lower cost.  
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Yet, Silveira (2009) indicated that several domestic developments began to change 
this scenario in 2004, notably the surge in Initial Public Offerings (IPO) to list in Novo 
Mercado, one of the newly created premium listing segments of the stock exchange, in 
which all shares must be voting and companies need to comply with an assortment of 
corporate governance practices beyond legal requirements. The author asserted that Brazil 
faced a substantial shift in ownership structure in the ensuing years. An expressive minority 
of companies begins to display lower control concentration levels and a few could even be 
characterized by dispersed ownership and management control. This reconfiguration 
brought about important changes in the structure and practices of boards of directors, 
improved the disclosure and quality of company information, and potentially enhanced 
investor protection. A new hybrid model of ownership surfaced, in which a large minority 
of companies typically had a shared control group formalized under an agreement of 
shareholders, instead of a clear controlling shareholder.  
Still, Sternberg, Leal and Bortolon (2011) stated that the overall concentration of 
control rights remained very high, even though it was significantly lower in the 
aforementioned premium listing segments. Furthermore, the authors evinced that 
agreements among shareholders became more frequent with the reduction in control 
concentration, regardless of the existence of a controlling shareholder. Carvalhal (2012) 
said that the role of shareholder agreements in mitigating potential conflicts of interest 
among controlling and minority shareholders was positively related to firm value and could 
produce a better degree of investor protection. On the other hand, Gelman, Castro and 
Seidler (2015) claimed that the impact of shareholder agreements on firm value in Brazil is 
negative when the vote of directors is bound in a generic fashion to the will of the 
signatories. This effect becomes positive when there is binding exclusively for specific 
issues. They maintain that Carvalhal (2012) optimistically evaluated the role of 
shareholder agreements because most minority shareholders do not take part in it and the 
controlling group of shareholders may still subject them to expropriation.  
Brazil faced a serious economic crisis in 2014-2016, which seems to have 
interrupted the decreasing trend in control concentration. The number of companies with 
major shareholders owning more than 50 per cent of the voting shares rose from 41 per 
cent in 2014 to 47 per cent in 2015. Accordingly, the percentage of companies with 
minority or shared control dropped from 54 to 49 per cent in the same period (Capital 
Aberto, 2015). The lower stock prices following the domestic economic slowdown became 
an incentive to acquisitions, which in turn led to a reduction in market free float, possibly 
increasing control concentration. Many public companies were acquired and then went 
private. Others simply delisted because they no longer saw advantages in the costs of 
remaining public. Some companies abandoned the premium lists for the first time. In 
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tandem with these events, a policy of greater state intervention in the economy, both as 
financier and provider of selective economic incentives, reduced the role of capital 
markets. These new events brought about old challenges to continuous corporate 
governance practices improvement and gave way to a reenergized control concentration 
trend.   
 
3 – PREMIUM LISTING REQUIREMENTS REFORM 
 
Maybe it is in difficult times that new opportunities shape up, says the old cliché. 
Back in 2000, The Securities, Commodities, and Futures Exchange of Brazil 
(BM&FBovespa), the unified stock exchange of the country, was facing a very serious threat 
when Brazilian companies were listing their American Depository Receipts (ADRs) in the US 
and trade revenues were flowing away. The exchange responded with the launch of 
differentiated corporate governance listing segments in December 2000. The three new 
premium levels – Levels 1 and 2 and Novo Mercado – demanded corporate governance 
and transparency practices over and above the requirements in the Brazilian Corporate 
Law and in the complementary regulations issued by the Brazilian Securities Commission 
(Comissão de Valores Mobiliários – CVM).  
These premium segments are a private initiative in order to improve the credibility 
of Brazilian public companies and capital market. They are an opt-in system, in which the 
joining companies voluntarily elect to comply with higher corporate governance and 
disclosure standards. These premium lists are an alternative between a more detailed, and 
less flexible, law, which is obviously mandatory, and corporate governance codes, which in 
Brazil are recommendations that are not subject to comply or explain rules. The 
introduction of three new premium lists with increasing demands also contributed to 
latitude. Yet, migration was only partial, as many companies remained listed in the old 
listing segment that came to be called "traditional". Newly listed companies embraced the 
premium lists, especially between 2004 and 2007.  
Level 1 demands that companies improve the disclosure and increase the 
dispersion of their shares by means of several specific requirements. A company must 
agree to all the obligations of Level 1 and adopt an additional broader range of corporate 
governance practices involving the board of directors and rights for non-voting shares to 
list in Level 2. Moreover, companies must abide to quicker dispute resolution through 
arbitration. Novo Mercado, the most demanding premium segment, calls for the company 
to comply with all the requirements of Levels 1 and 2 in addition to solely issuing voting 
shares. Hence, the main distinction between Level 2 and Novo Mercado is the ban of non-
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voting shares in the latter. The Brazilian corporate law does not allow different voting rights 
among common shares; thus, the one-share-one-vote principle is a Novo Mercado 
requirement. Carvalhal (2012) describes the three premium segments in detail. The 
interested reader may also exam them at the BM&FBovespa website.  
Following its very successful years between 2004 and 2007, BM&FBovespa 
initiated discussions to reform the premium listing rules in 2008. The natural evolution of 
corporate governance practices around the world, especially with legislation introduced 
elsewhere in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008, and the steady 
development of Brazilian regulation, such as the mandatory adoption of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the introduction of a much more comprehensive 
and detailed format of information reporting to CVM that came into effect in 2009, which 
required more transparency about many aspects, such as related party transactions, 
compensation, and internal controls, motivated the exchange. Multi-billion dollar losses 
from some high-profile Brazilian listed companies due to derivatives transactions after the 
emergence of the global financial crisis and the consequent need to strengthen market 
credibility also encouraged the reform process. It took more than two years to conclude 
the process in which companies listed in the premium segments voted on ten reform 
proposals and rejected three of them. Table 1 details the three proposals that have been 
rejected.  
The promoters of the stock exchange rules reform considered these three rejected 
proposals very important and there was a sense of frustration about many of the 
companies already in the premium listing segments turning them down. Were these 
companies really committed to better corporate governance practices? Silveira (2010) 
alleges that the answer may be in the nature of their controlling shareholders. Family firms 
controlled by founders or heirs have historically preferred to improve only the minimum 
necessary in their corporate governance practices, as noted by the author. He also points 
out that the presence of relevant institutional investors was not material to inhibit the 




Table 1 – Rejected Novo Mercado reform proposals  
 
Proposed rule Detail Segment 
Votes for / 
abstentions 
Votes against 
Composition of the 
Board of Directors 
For Novo Mercado and Level 2: 
Increase from 20 to 30 per cent 
the number of independent 
board members  
For Level 1: minimum of five 
board members of which at least 




51 (48.6%) 54 (51.4%) 
Level 2 11 (57.9%) 8 (42.1%) 
Level 1 17 (48.6%) 18 (51.4%) 
Audit Committee  
Requirement for an audit 
committee comprised of a 
minimum of three members 
elected by the Board of Directors, 
of which at least one must be an 
independent board member. 
Three-year deadline for 
conforming to the new rule. 
Novo 
Mercado 
44 (41.9%) 61 (58.1%) 
Level 2 12 (63.2%) 7 (36.8%) 





for Novo Mercado 
only) 
Mandatory bid rule applicable in 
the hypothesis of a shareholder 
(alone or acting in concert with 
others) hitting 30 per cent 
ownership threshold. In this case, 
he or she would have to make an 
offer to buy all outstanding 
shares for a price equivalent to 
the highest share price paid by 




45 (42.9%) 60 (57.1%) 
 
The recent Brazilian economic set backs and the reduced capital market relevance 
once again motivated the exchange to seek improvement in corporate governance 
practices as a way out of the crisis. BM&FBovespa presented a new plan to reform Novo 
Mercado rules in 2015. They sought the support of foreign investors, which are 
increasingly important in the domestic stock market, and will submit the proposals to a 
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public hearing in the beginning of 2016 (REUTERS BRASIL, 2015). They hope that 
companies are truly committed with better corporate governance practices and are not 
simply seeking a label while posing with weak fundamentals. It is also worth noting that 
many companies have recently delisted from the premium segments and the exchange 
altogether. There was one case of a company delisting from Novo Mercado to trade in the 
traditional segment, and of companies going public and listing in the traditional segment, 
disdaining Novo Mercado. Curiously, the controlling shareholder of one of these 
traditional listings, a financial institution, was jailed afterwards on charges of obstruction of 
justice and corruption in dealings with the government and political parties in a major 
corruption investigation under way in Brazil that has reached into the highest posts of the 
republic. Thus, the time for a new reform is probably due.  
 
4 – COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE 
 
CVM introduced a new regulation in 2009 that significantly expanded what 
companies should disclose in their annual information report, including all sorts of 
compensation details, among many other topics. Before the introduction of the new 
compensation disclosure demands, Brazilian companies used to provide only very general 
information about their compensation policy and solely disclose the total amount expected 
to be paid to the board of directors and top management team altogether. The 
instruments and policies used to divide and pay this amount was not disclosed and 
shareholders only approved this lump sum as a kind of annual budget. This usually did not 
represent a practical problem because companies had a controlling shareholder with the 
necessary votes to approve. This meeting of shareholders practice remains even under the 
new regulation. However, there have been a few recent cases in which shareholders 
rejected the usual lump sum proposal on the condition that the board should present more 
details.   
Compensation may be related to performance in Brazil. Carvalhal and Chien 
(2013) studied compensation in 420 Brazilian listed companies between 2002 and 2009, 
before the introduction of the new compensation disclosure rules. They claim a significant 
and positive relationship between total compensation and performance.  
Pinto and Leal (2013) studied compensation after the introduction of the new 
disclosure rules in 2009. They conclude that Brazilian firms with no controlling shareholder 
or coalition pay an average of 79 per cent more to senior managers, twice more to the 
chief executive officer (CEO), and 80 per cent more to the board of directors. The authors 
also analysed the compensation characteristics of family firms. In those cases, CEOs 
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receive 43 per cent more and the compensation of the board of directors increases 
proportionally to family membership in the board. On the other hand, they surmised that 
companies with a lower degree of ownership concentration pay higher compensation to 
top executives and that company size and the identity of controlling shareholders also 
seem to be compensation determinants in Brazil.  
The Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (Instituto Brasileiro de Governança 
Corporativa – IBGC) has been producing occasional surveys about the compensation of 
board members and senior management. The most recent report (IBGC, 2015), with data 
from 2013, shows that the median annual individual compensation in the board of 
directors is about R$ 144,598 (US$ 29,597) and the maximum goes past R$ 14 million 
(US$ 3,615,702). Some board members, especially those associated to the controlling 
families, may earn much more than other directors. In comparison with 2012, in general 
the median compensation rose 11.7 per cent. Yet, the median of companies listed in the 
premium segments decreased, especially due to a reduction in the variable compensation 
paid to board members.  
There was also a growth of 12.3 per cent in the median compensation of senior 
management in the same period. The median annual compensation was about R$ 
1,234,877 (US$ 318,925) and the maximum was over R$ 13 million (US$ 3,357,438). A 
reduction in the variable compensation was reported for companies listed in the premium 
listing Level 2 and in the traditional segments. According to the report, Brazil does not 
show a frequent use of variable compensation to board members because almost 80 per 
cent of the companies pay solely fixed compensation. This is different with senior 
managers, as merely 24.4 per cent of companies pay fixed compensation exclusively. A 
significant majority of companies uses a package that combines fixed, variable, and stock 
compensation to pay senior managers, following usual international practices.  
The new compensation disclosure rule introduced in 2009 was not well received by 
many companies. Even though the new rule only demanded that the average, minimum, 
and maximum compensation was disclosed, without associating individual board and 
senior management members to their compensation packages, the reaction came swiftly in 
the form of a preliminary court injunction secured by the Brazilian Institute of Financial 
Executives (Instituto Brasileiro de Executivos Financeiros - IBEF) in 2010. This institution has 
members in virtually every public Brazilian company and is representative of the 
professionals they employ.  
IBEF claimed that disclosing the maximum compensation singled out the most 
important individuals in the company, exposing them to criminals and to a greater risk of 
kidnapping, which is in violation to basic constitutional safety and privacy rights. A federal 
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court granted the injunction, CVM appealed, and a higher court upheld the lower court 
decision. Companies now had a legal option of non-compliance with the rule until a final 
decision on the matter is reached, what could easily take more than a decade.  
This event is another illustration of the set backs suffered by promoters of good 
corporate governance practices in Brazil and investors in general. It also provides a 
concrete example of how the slowness of the Brazilian judiciary may be used to hinder the 
adoption of certain corporate governance practices. On the positive side, the number of 
companies using the injunction has decreased, with growing pressures from not-for-profit 
organizations such as IBGC and the Association of Capital Market Investors (Associação 
de Investidores no Mercado de Capitais - AMEC), an organization of domestic and foreign 
asset managers, that also includes some well known foreign pension funds like Calpers. 
Yet, this figure was still around ten per cent of listed companies by the end of 2015, 
including some of the largest financial, industrial, and commercial companies in the 
country, a few of them operating important governmental concessions.  
Research about this injunction by Barros, Silveira, Bortolon, and Leal (2015) 
showed that there was no association between crime levels in the state the companies are 
headquartered and the probability of non-compliance with the new rule. Non-compliance, 
on the other hand, was associated with ownership concentration, company size, and 
poorer corporate governance practices and performance. Compliance was more frequent 
among companies controlled by the state and foreign entities. These authors performed an 
event study and allege that shareholders were surprised when some companies with good 
ex-ante corporate governance quality scores became non-compliers. On the other hand, 
they were not caught off guard when companies with a poorer corporate governance track 
record used the injunction to avert compliance.  
 
5 – INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
 
Institutional investors hold more than five per cent of the voting shares in about half 
of the larger publicly traded Brazilian companies, which correspond to about 99% of the 
market value (OECD, 2013). Many believe that the presence of institutional investors spurs 
the improvement of corporate governance practices due to their presumed ability to nudge 
investee companies in the right direction, through their engagement with management, 
voting and proposing in the meetings of shareholders, or board membership, for example. 
Yet, there is a gloomy side to institutional investor ownership. They may align with 
management or the controlling shareholders of companies and act in detriment of the 
minority, even when they are part of it. One example is institutional investors whose parent 
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entity is a state-owned company. They may align with the political orientation of 
government appointees even when their acts are harmful to the interests of those they 
represent. Institutional investor engagement in Brazil is still considered low, perhaps more 
out of concern for protecting themselves from expropriation by dominant shareholders 
than for disciplining such stakeholders.  
A recent and elucidative case involved several institutional investors connected to 
the Brazilian federal government. The three largest pension funds in the country are: Petros 
(sponsored by Petrobras, Brazil's oil giant and largest company); Previ (sponsored by 
Banco do Brasil, Brazil's largest bank); and Funcef (sponsored by Caixa, Brazil's third 
largest bank). The federal government controls these three companies. CVM fined the 
three pension funds in early December 2014 for voting on candidates for the board 
representation of the minority shareholders of Petrobras in 2011 and 2012. The CVM 
commissioners concluded that the federal government, the largest shareholder of 
Petrobras, interferes in the decision making process of these pension funds as well. Thus, 
they cannot be considered independent minority shareholders, but acquiesce in the federal 
government's proposals. Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 
(BNDES) and BNDES Participações (BNDESPAR), both giant development institutions 
controlled by the federal government, settled with CVM under the same proceedings. On 
the positive side, one must note that CVM commissioners, also nominated by the federal 
government and approved by the senate, acted independently to curb the abuse.  
The previous case may hint at why the evidence concerning the influence of 
institutional investors on the corporate governance practices of Brazilian companies is 
inconclusive. Most Brazilian pension funds hold very minor equity positions because yields 
on debt securities have outclassed the stock market performance in the last twenty years. 
Brazil boasts one of the highest interest rates in the world. The largest pension funds, those 
controlled by the federal government, contrast with the majority because they are among 
the few with notable equity holdings. Maybe this is at the root of why pension funds have 
displayed negative or no relationship with the quality of corporate governance practices 
(PUNSUVO et al., 2007; OLIVEIRA et al., 2012). The few that are important equity holders 
may display a muddled behaviour given their conflict of interest regarding some relevant 
investees.  
The performance of BNDES is also often questioned as some authors allude that 
their loans are not necessarily extended to companies showing better corporate 
governance practices (SILVEIRA, 2011; LAZZARINI and MUSACCHIO, 2011). It is possible 
that the political entanglements of these institutions translate into a lack of clarity on the 
effects of their engagements with investees. On the other hand, private institutions rarely 
engage with management, at least in the public fashion many US activists do. Even so, 
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there is some evidence that private equity and mutual funds may lead to improvements in 
corporate governance practices when they engage management (SILVEIRA, 2010).  
Institutional investors should keep their independence from investees or should be 
barred from investing in companies in which conflicts of interest may arise. An institutional 
investor may act as an independent minority shareholder for an investee, taking steps in 
favour of their beneficiaries, and simultaneously act in concert with controlling 
shareholders of another investee, but harmfully to its beneficiaries. This aspect may be 
particularly relevant in the Brazilian context where the largest institutional investors are 
controlled by the state. Regulatory initiatives to increase the power of institutional investors 
must address these conflicts of interest issues. The nomination process for the board and 
senior management of institutional investors should strive to select independent individuals. 
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